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180 GRAY v. BRINKERIIOPF [41 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 2231:3. In Bank. June 30, 19:33.] 
MILTON F. GRAY et al., Appellants, v. VERD C. BRIN-
KERHO:B':B' et al., Respondents. 
[1] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether defendant 
was guilty of negligence or plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence is ordinarily a question of mixed fact and law, and 
may be determined as a matter of law only if reasonable men 
following the law can draw but one conclusion from the evi-
dence presented. 
[2] Automobiles-Care Toward Pedestrians-Yielding Right of 
Way.-Failure of motorist to yield right of way to pedestrian 
crossing roadway within marked crosswalk, as required by Veh. 
Code, § :360, subd. (a), constitutes a violation of the statute 
and negligence as a matter of law in the absence of reasonable 
explanation for such conduct. 
[3] !d.-Care Toward Pedestrians-Yielding Right of Way.-Fail-
ure of motorist to yield right of way to pedestrian crossing 
street within marked crosswalk is not excused by fact that his 
attention was "diverted" by a "fast approaching car" which 
made a right turn into street instead of continuing on another 
street as he expected it to do, where motorist had stopped in 
center of intersection to allow other vehicle to pass and there-
after started his truck again, driving into crosswalk without 
seeing pedestrians who might be there, and striking plaintiff, 
it appearing that motorist could have seen plaintiff if he had 
exercised ordinary care. 
[ 4] !d.-Care Toward Pedestrians-Persons Within Crosswalk.-
A motorist has no right to assume that a marked pe.destrian 
crosswalk is clear, and it is his duty in starting up and driving 
his vehicle into and through the crosswalk to ascertain whether 
plainly visible pede.strians are using such crosswalk and to 
yield the right of way to them. 
[5] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Persons Crossing Streets.-A 
person crossing a street within a marked crosswalk is not guilty 
of contributory negligence where, until "perhaps a second" 
before she was struck by defendant's vehicle, she had no reason 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Neg·ligence., §§ 138, 141; Am.Jur., Neglige.nce, 
§§ 344, 348. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, §§ 269, 270; Am.Jur., Auto-
mobiles, § 211 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, §§ 158, 160, 168, 169; 
[2-4] Automobiles,§ 117; [5] Automobiles,§ 128; [6] Automobiles, 
§ 297(3). 
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to believe that defendant intended to violate her right of way 
and proceed into the crosswalk and against her body, she not 
being required to "run" from the vehicle, and where she made 
an effort "to hurry to the island in the middle." 
[6] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Contributory Negligence.-
The rule that whether a mistake in judgment by a pedestrian, 
when crossing a street, as to the speed and danger of an ap-
proaching vehicle constitutes contributory negligence is a 
question for the jury, is inapplicable where the only relevant 
mistake plaintiff could have made as to the speed and danger 
of the approaching vehicle would be the belief that defendant 
driver intended to obey the law and not turn into and across 
the pedestrian crosswalk and strike her in complete disregard 
of her right of way, and where defendant's vehicle, which had 
come to a complete stop in the center of the intersection and 
after starting again had at no time exceeded a speed of 8 
to 10 miles per hour, would give a reasonable pedestrian law-
fully in the crosswalk no cause for apprehension that the 
speed of the vehicle constituted such an imminent danger that 
she should run from it, as under such circumstances she had 
the right to assume that the driver would obey the law, drive 
in a reasonable manner, observe her right of way, and yield it. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Lol" 
Angeles County. A. A. Scott, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by 
pedestrian when struck by vehicle in a marked crosswalk. 
.Judgment for defendants reversed. 
Hirson & Horn and Theodore A. Horn for Appellants. 
Joseph A. Zahradka and Robert Glines for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, ap-
peal from an adverse judgment entered upon a jury verdict 
in their action for damages for personal injuries suffered by 
the wife when she was struck by a pickup truck driven by 
defendant Brinkerhoff in the course of his employment by 
defendant Nitzen. \Ve have concluded that the evidence 
establishes negligence as a matter of law on the part of 
Brinkerhoff and is insufficient to support a finding of con-
tributory negligence on the part of the wife, and that the 
judgment must therefore be reversed. Hereinafter in this 
opinion plaintiff-wife will be referred to as plaintiff, and 
Brinkerhoff will be referred to as defendant. 
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The evidence is without substantial conflict. At the time 
of the accident, plaintiff, carrying a bag of groceries, was at-
tempting to walk across Manchester Boulevard, which runs 
in an east-west direction, at its intersection with Airport 
Boulevard, which runs north-south, in Los Angeles. Plain-
tiff waited on the curb at the southeast corner of the inter-
section until the traffic light changed from red to green for 
north-south traffic on Airport, so that she could lawfully pro-
ceed north across Manchester in the marked pedestrian cross-
walk. The crosswalk was some 15 feet wide, and the distance 
from the curb, where plaintiff was standing, to an island 
located down the center of Manchester was about 30 feet. 
Defendant, who was driving south on Airport in a pickup 
truck, had stopped at the northwest corner of the inter-
section, also waiting for the green light; he was in the lane 
next to the center of Airport, as he intended to make a left 
turn onto Manchester. When the light changed to green, 
plaintiff started walking across Manchester in the crosswalk, 
and defendant started his truck, signaled his intention to make 
a left turn, and proceeded into the intersection. When he 
was about halfway across Manchester and before making his 
left turn, defendant again stopped his truck to permit an-
other car, which was going north on Airport, to continue 
through the intersection. The other car, however, made a 
right turn into Manchester, and defendant then started his 
truck again, made his left turn, and drove into the crosswalk, 
striking plaintiff's shoulder with a "rack" attached over 
the left front fender of the truck, "pushing" her out of the 
crosswalk, and injuring her. 
Plaintiff, while still waiting on the curb for the light to turn 
green, observed defendant's truck stopped at the inter-
section in the lane next to the center line of Airport, saw 
the truck start to move toward the south when the signal 
changed and plaintiff started north across Manchester, and 
watched its progress into the intersection. When plaintiff 
had gone about 10 feet from the curb, the truck was approach-
ing the center of the intersection. When it reached the center 
of the intersection it was going about 5 miles an hour, and 
plaintiff realized at that time that it was going to make a 
left turn. When the truck, after stopping for the approaching 
car, had started again and was about 15 feet from the cross-
walk plaintiff was some 10 feet from the island, walking 
"App:coximately in the middle" of the crosswalk. When 
plaintiff was a step or two from the island the truck, which 
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both plaintiff and defendant testified was then going at a 
speed of 8 or 10 miles an hour, struck her. The truck moved 
7 or 8 feet further ahead and then stopped. Plaintiff when 
first struck dropped her bag of groceries, seized hold of the 
rack above the fender in order not to be thrown under the 
truck, and receive repeated blows to her knees and shoulder 
as she "was being pushed back" out of the crosswalk. The 
weather and the street were dry and it was clear daylight at 
the time. 
Plaintiff testified that she had been watching the truck 
almost continuously during her progress across the inter-
section; through the truck's windshield she saw both de-
fendant driver and a coemploye who was riding with him and 
they seemed "to be looking in" her direction; when she "first 
realized that the truck was coming on the crosswalk . . . I 
tried to hurry to the island in the middle,'' although she did 
not run; she then had "perhaps a second" to "get out of 
the way"; she was then "about five feet" from the island; 
''I was in plain sight and . . . he looked like he would pass 
right behind me ... [T]here wasn't room for him to go in 
front of me by that time.'' 
Defendant testified that his windshield was clear; he did 
not see plaintiff at any time until after his "truck had actually 
impacted her," and he saw no other people in the crosswalk; 
after he stopped in the center of the intersection for the on-
coming car, he was "looking east on Manchester" as he ap-
proached the crosswalk; there was nothing that would obstruct 
his view except the corner post on the truck as he was in 
the swing of the left turn; his brakes were in good condition. 
[1] Whether or not defendant was guilty of negligence 
(see Toschi v. Christian (1944), 24 Cal.2d 354, 360 [149 P.2d 
848] ; Mosley v. Arden Farms Co. ( 1945), 26 Cal.2d 213, 217 
[157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 872]; Polk v. City of Los Angeles 
(1945), 26 Cal.2d 519, 530 [159 P.2d 931]; 19 Cal.Jur. 731, 
and cases there cited) or plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence (Pewitt v. Riley (1945), 27 Ca1.2d 310, 316 [163 
P.2d 873]; Anthony v. Hobbie (1945), 25 Cal.2d 814, 818 
[155 P.2d 826], and cases there cited; see, also, 19 Cal.Jur. 
735-738) is ordinarily a question of mixed fact and law an(i 
may be determined as a matter of law only if reasonable m~n 
following the law can draw but one conclusion from the evi-
dence presented. (See, also, Zibbell v. Southern Pac. Co. 
(1911), 160 Cal. 237, 241 [116 P. 513]; Reaugh v. Cudahy 
Packing Co. (1922), 189 Cal. 335, 343 [208 P. 125]; Young 
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v. Southern Pac. Co. (1920), 182 Cal. 369, 375 [190 P. 36]; 
Dennis v. Gonzales (1949), 91 Cal.App.2d 203,209 [205 P.2d 
55].) 
[2] It is our view that defendant's own testimony shows 
indubitably that he was guilty of negligence proximately 
causing plaintiff's injuries. By the provisions of section 560, 
subdivision (a), of the Vehicle Code, "The driver of a vehicle 
shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing the road-
way within any marked crosswalk. . . . " It is undisputed that 
defendant did not yield the right of way to plaintiff. Such 
failure constitutes a violation of the statute and negligence 
as a matter of law in the absence of reasonable explanation for 
defendant's conduct. (See Satterlee v. Orange Glen School 
Dist. (1947), 29 Cal.2d 581, 589 [177 P.2d 279]; Ornales v. 
Wigger ( 1950), 35 Cal.2d 47 4, 4 77-480 [ 218 P .2d 531] ; Finney 
v. Wierman (1942), 52 Cal.App.2d 282, 284 [126 P.2d 143]; 
Lafrenz v. Stoddard (1942), 50 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [122 P.2d 
374] .) 
[3] Defendant in attempted excuse of his conduct sug-
gests that his "attention w~s diverted" by the "fast ap-
proaching car" which made a right turn into Manchester 
instead of continuing north on Airport as defendant had 
expected it to do. However, that vehicle after turning to 
the right obviously constituted no hazard to defendant, who 
had stopped in the center of the intersection to allow it to 
pass, and provides no excuse whatsoever for his thereafter 
starting his truck again, driving into the crosswalk without 
seeing pedestrians who might be there, and striking plaintiff. 
];-,or a driver to cause or allow his vehicle to continue into 
and across such a crosswalk while his attention is so ''diverted'' 
constitutes in itself a yiolation of the statute for which he must 
be held responsible. 
Defendant suggests further that although his attention 
was ''diverted,'' nevertheless ''while in his turn, the left 
front corner post on the truck probably obscured his seeing'' 
plaintiff. Again, we are not impressed with this tentative 
offering of an excuse. Under the circumstances shown it 
appears to us that the evidence does not reasonably admit 
of any conclusion other than that defendant could have ful-
filled his duty to look for pedestrians and could have seen 
plaintiff if he had exercised ordinary care. [4] He had no 
right to assume that the crosswalk was clear (People v. Lett 
(1947), 77 Cal.App.2d 917, 919 [177 P.2d 47]); it was his 
duty in starting up and driving his vehicle into and through 
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the crosswalk to ascertain whether plainly visible pedestrians 
were using such crosswalk and it was his obligation to yield 
the right of way to them (Fischer v. Keen (1941), 43 Cal. 
App.2d 244, 249 [110 P.2d 693] ). We hold that the evidence 
establishes that defendant was negligent as a matter of law. 
[5] It is equally apparent that plaintiff was free from 
negligence proximately contributing to her injuries. She was 
lawfully where pedestrians are expected to be found at inter-
sections and until "perhaps a second" before the impact she 
had no reason to believe that defendant intended to violate 
her right of way and proceed into the crosswalk and against 
her body. Under such circumstances, she was not allowed 
sufficient time, and it does not appear that she was required, 
to "run " 1 from his vehicle, as defendant (apparently seeking 
to invoke a sort of reverse last clear chance doctrine) sug-
gests she should have done, although she did make an effort 
''to hurry to the island in the middle.'' 
[6] Defendant relies on the rule that "Whether a mistake 
in judgment by a pedestrian when crossing a street, as to the 
speed and danger of an approaching vehicle constitutes con-
tributory negligence is a question for the jury." (Kirk v. 
Los Angeles Ry. Corp. (1945), 26 Cal.2d 833, 839 [161 P.2d 
673, '164 A.L.R. 1] .) In the cited case the traffic signal 
changed after plaintiff pedestrian had started across the inter-
section; plaintiff's companions reached the far curb safely 
but plaintiff while hurrying to do the same dropped her purse 
and was struck by a streetcar when she stopped to pick it up. 
The judgment of nonsuit was reversed by this court with 
the statement that the matter of contributory negligence should 
have gone to the jury. In the case now presented, however, the 
only relevant mistake which plaintiff could have made as to 
the speed and danger of the approaching vehicle would be the 
belief that defendant driver intended to obey the law and 
not turn into and across the pedestrian crosswalk and strike 
her in complete disregard of her right of way. Defendant's 
vehicle, which had come to a complete stop in the center of 
the intersection and after starting again had at no time ex-
ceeded a speed of 8 to 10 miles an hour, obviously would give 
a reasonable pedestrian lawfully in the crosswalk no cause 
for apprehension that the speed of the vehicle constituted 
such an imminent danger that she should run from it. Under 
1It may be noted that there are traffic signs in some localities which 
expressly direct pedestrians to "WALK" and do not suggest "RuN." 
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such circumstances we find no merit in defendant's argument 
that inasmuch as plaintiff had observed the truck from the 
time it left the center of the intersection until it struck her, 
her failure to inerease her speed until ''perhaps a second'' 
before he pushed her out of the crosswalk could be considered 
to be contributory negligence. (See LeBlanc v. Browne 
(1947), 78 Cal.App.2d 63, 71-75 [177 P.2d 347] .) Under 
the circumstances shown here, plaintiff had the right to assume 
that defendant driver would obey the law, drive in a reason-
able manner, observe her right of way, and yield it. (See 
Schulman v. Los Angeles Ry. Gorp. (1941), 44 Cal.App.2d 
122, 126 [111 P.2d 924]; Foerster v. Direito (1946), 75 Cal. 
App.2d 323, 330-331 [170 P.2d 986]; Ladas v. Johnson's B. 
& W. Taxicab Oo. (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 223, 228 [110 P.2d 
449] .) 
By reason of our conclusion that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the verdict, it becomes unnecessary to consider 
plaintiff's further contention that certain of the instructions 
g·iven to the jury prejudically overemphasized her duty and 
minimized that of defendant. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTEH, J.-I dissent. 
Contrary to the majority opinion the issues of negligence 
and contributory negligence were for the jury, and its de-
termination thereof against plaintiff is binding on this court. 
The evidence is such that reasonable minds could find either 
the presence or absence of the factors necessary to establish 
those issues. 
The basis of the majority opinion is, on the issue of negli-
gence, that defendant was required to yield the right of 
way to plaintiff and his failure to do so was negligence as a 
matter of law; on the issue of contributory negligence, that 
plaintiff was not required to run when she saw defendant's 
truck approaching and thus was free from contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. Those bases fail to take into 
consideration other factors which the jury could and did use 
as a basis for its verdict. 
On the issue of negligence there are several significant 
facts upon which a finding of no negligence could be based. 
'l'he intersection where the accident occurred was a busy one 
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and there was considerable traffic there at the time. This 
presented a situation where plaintiff was not the only person 
to be watched--toward whom care was to be exercised. Other 
hazards required constant attention by defendant with the 
accompanying necessity of making decisions governing his 
conduct. Whether his decisions were those of a person of 
ordinary prudence was a question for the jury. Defendant 
proceeded into the intersection with the "Go" signal as he 
was lawfully entitled to do. He gave proper signals for 
making a left turn which was legally authorized. He was 
travelling at a low rate of speed. As he was making a left 
turn and approaching the crosswalk which plaintiff was using, 
a car approaching at a high speed from his right swung right 
around the corner across his prospective route. That car 
crossed the crosswalk to the rear of plaintiff. It is reason-
able to assume that defendant's attention would be focussed 
on that vehicle which would have a bearing on whether he 
was careless in failing to observe plaintiff in the crosswalk. 
Moreover, he may reasonably have assumed that, as that car 
proceeded across the crosswalk apparently without mishap, 
there was no one on the crosswalk. Defendant testified that 
he did not see plaintiff on the crosswalk. The jury could 
have believed that testimony. True, it could have disbelieved 
it, because plaintiff was there and there was evidence that 
plaintiff was looking in the direction of defendant's car, but 
that was the jury's function, not ours. There were reasons 
why the jury may have chosen to believe defendant. He testi-
fied that the upright support for the top, door and windshield 
of his car obscured his vision. His attention was diverted by 
the car which turned right into his path and led him into 
a sense of security by its crossing the crosswalk without mis-
hap. There was a large amount of traffic at the intersection. 
Indeed the majority opinion is based on the theory that de-
fendant was negligent in failing to see plaintiff because she 
was on the crosswalk, but that assumes that she was there. 
That assumption cannot be made because the jury could have 
disbelieved her testimony as to her presence in the cross-
walk-at a point in the path of defendant's oncoming car. 
From testimony that defendant did not see her in the cross-
walk when, if she was where she said she was, the jury could 
infer that she was not there; that she had reached the island 
in the center of the street, had become confused and stepped 
back into the path of defendant's car, or that she darted ahead 
across the path of defendant's car just as the right turning 
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car passed behind her. Of course, if defendant did not see 
plaintiff before the impact, and his failure to see her was not 
negligence, there is no basis for a finding of negligence in 
his failure to yield the right of way and the entire founda-
tion of the majority opinion crumbles. 
·with reference to contributory negligence, there was suffi-
cient from which the jury could find its existence. Plaintiff 
testified that she was watching defendant's car approaching 
all of the time. It could be inferred, therefore, that she walked 
directly into the path of an oncoming car and after taking 
that chance, made no effort to hurry or avoid being struck 
by the car. Moreover, as before discussed, the jury could 
have believed that defendant did not see her, that she darted 
in front of his car when the other car made a right turn 
behind her, or could have disbelieved her testimony that she 
was watching defendant's car and concluded that she walked 
across the crosswalk blindly and with total disregard of her 
safety. Based upon any of those premises or other possi-
bilities, reasonable men could have concluded that she was 
guilty of contributory negligence. 
Furthermore, the facts may have appeared to the jury in 
such a light as to justify the conclusion that neither plaintiff 
nor defendant was negligent-that the occurrence was what is 
sometimes called an "unavoidable accident" where no one 
is at fault and hence no recovery may be had. 
In regard to yielding the right of way where a pedestrian 
was struck while crossing the street and defendant testified he 
did not see him, the court said in Edwards v. McCormick, 
79 Cal.App.2d 800, 804 [181 P.2d 58]: "In the instant case, 
as commented upon in respondents' brief, 'It was for the jury 
to decide whether respondent's failure to see the deceased was 
a negligent failure. His failure to yield the right of way 
arose from his failure to see the pedestrian before he did; the 
two are inextricably intertwined. Hence it would have been 
an invasion of the province of the jury for the court to have 
laid down an inflexible rule that if respondent did not yield 
the right of way he ·was negligent as a matter of law.' Under 
the evidence disclosed by the record, negligence and con-
tributory negligence were questions of fact and not of law .... 
''The appellants insist that 'The verdict and judgment are 
against the law, in that deceased had a right to assume de-
fendant would obey the law (and yield the right of way), and 
in that deceased being confronted by a sudden peril he was 
not guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to pass in 
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front of defendant's automobile.' It is also argued that 
'plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the presumption that 
the deceased obeyed the law in that he exercised ordinary care 
for his own safety and therefore the verdict was against the 
evidence if the defendant was guilty of negligence.' These 
contentions, however, proceed on the assumption that the 
defendant was, and the deceased was not, guilty of negligence 
in the situation presented. And, as already indicated, such 
matters involve questions of fact, not of law. Neither a pre-
sumption of due care on the part of the deceased, nor any 
right to assume that respondent driver would yield the right 
of way, can alter this situation, -or, in fact, do more than 
merely raise a conflict in the evidence. As pointed out in 
respondents' brief, 'It is clear that a pedestrian has no privi-
lege of relying on right of way blindly or in the face of ob-
vious danger.' (Fischer v. Keen, 43 Cal.App.2d 244 [110 P.2d 
693] ; Reed v. Stroh, 54 Cal.App.2d 183 [128 P.2d 829] .) " 
(See Bedell v. Duniven, 77 Cal.App.2d 145 [174 P.2d 666] ; 
O'Brien v. Schellberg, 59 Cal.App.2d 764 [140 P.2d 159] .) 
'l'he conclusion reached by the majority here must be based 
upon the unqualified assumption that all of the testimony of 
plaintiff is true and that at least some of defendant's testi-
mony is false. Thus the majority is weighing the evidence, 
without seeing the witnesses or hearing them testify, thereby 
invading the exclusive province of the triers of fact-the 
jury and trial judge. The position of the majority here is 
not only out of harmony with the settled law of this state 
(see Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [143 P.2d 689] ; Craw-
ford v. So1tthern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427 [45 P.2d 183] ), but 
it places an undue burden upon this court-that of deciding 
issues of fact. I have heretofore adverted to the evils of this 
practice (see concurring and dissenting opinions in Daniels 
v. City and County of San Francisco, 40 Cal.2d 614, 627 
[255 P.2d 785] ; Saporito v. Purex Corp., Ltd., 40 Cal.2d 
608, 612 [255 P.2d 7] ; Barrett v. City of Claremont, 
ante, p. 70, 75 [256 P.2d 977] ). So far as this court is 
concerned, it is of recent development-just the last year or 
two (see Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246 P.2d 663] ; 
Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 
656 [225 P.2d 431] ; Better Food Mkts. v. American Dist. 
Teleg. Co., 40 Cal.2d 179 [253 P.2d 10]; Atkinson v. Pacific 
Fire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal.2d 192 [253 P.2d 18] ; Sutter 
Butte Canal Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 139 [251 
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P.2d 975]; Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 40 
Cal.2d 102 [251 P.2d 955]; Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 
40 Cal.2d 224 [253 P.2d 441]; Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal.2d 
254 [253 P.2d 447] ; Pirkle v. Oakdale Union etc. School Dist._, 
40 Cal.2d 207 [253 P.2d 1] ; Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., 
Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823 [256 P.2d 933]; Ktlrlan v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, 40 Cal.2d 799 [256 P.2d 962]; Weitzen-
korn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778 [256 P.2d 947]; Turner v. 
Mellon, ante, p. 45 [257 P.2d 15] ; Barrett v. City of 
Claremont, ante, p. 70 [256 P.2d 977] ; Estate of Ling-
enfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 [241 P.2d 990] ). I cannot refrain from 
again reiterating that this practice is not only in direct viola-
tion of the constitutional right of litigants to trial by jury, 
but is an insidious abuse of the judicial process. 
About 10 years ago (December 1, 1943), Mr. Justice 
Schauer in speaking for the majority of this court took a 
position diametrically opposed to the position now taken by 
him in the case at bar. As author of the majority opinion 
in Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [143 P.2d 689], he clearly 
and forcefully restated the traditional rule with respect to 
the function of this court and the District Courts of Appeal 
in reviewing findings of a trial court or jury. I concurred 
with Mr. Justice Schauer in the views expressed in that 
opinion and still believe that it should be the law of this 
state. I quote his pertinent language in that case and com-
mend it to his consideration in reaching a conclusion in the 
case at bar. In Estate of Bristol Mr. Justice Schauer stated 
at pages 223 and 224 as follows: ''The rules of evidence, 
the weight to be accorded to the evidence, and the province of 
a reviewing court, are the same in a will contest as in any 
other civil case. (Estate of Snowball (1910), 157 Cal. 301, 
305 [107 P. 598]; Estate of Barr (1924), 69 Cal.App. 16, 33 
[230 P. 181] .) The rule as to our province is: 'In reviewing 
the evidence . . . all conflicts must be resolved in favor of 
the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences 
indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elemen-
tary ... principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked 
as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins 
and ends with a determination as to whether there is any 
Stlbstantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which 
will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two 
or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, 
the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deduc-
tions for those of the trial court.' (Italics added.) (Craw-
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ford v. Southern Pac. Co. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 
183].) 'I'he rule quoted is as applicable in reviewing the find-
ings of a judge as it is when considering a jury's verdict. 
The critical word in the definition is 'substantial'; it is a 
door which can lead as readily to abuse as to practical or 
enlightened justice. It is common knowledge among judges 
and lawyers that many cases are determined to the entire 
satisfaction of trial judges or j1tries, on their factual issues, 
by eviclerwe which is over·whelming in its persttasiveness but 
which may appear relatively unsubstantial----1,f it can be re-
flected at allr-in a phonographie reeorcl. AppeUate courts, 
therefore, if there be any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to s1tstain a finding, should resolve that doubt 
in favor of the finding; and in searching the record and ex-
ploring the inferences which may arise from what is found 
there, to discover whether such doubt or conflict exists, the 
court should be realistic and practical. Upon such view of 
the law we cannot hold that any essential finding in this case 
is unsupported." (Emphasis added.) 
In some of my dissenting opinions I have called attention 
to the long established rule that it is only in cases where 
the uncontradicted evidence is such that reasonable minds 
cannot differ, that the issues of negligence and contributory 
negligence may be decided as issues of law. Heretofore the 
majority have not seen fit to discuss this rule, but have 
ignored it by the simple process of arbitrarily disregarding 
the determination of the trier of fact and holding as a matter 
of law that the evidence supporting such determination was 
insufficient (see Rodabaugh v. Tekus, S'Upra; Better Food 
Mkts. v. American Dist. Teleg. Co., snpra; Atkinson v. Pacific 
Fire Extinguisher Co., snpra; Goodman v. Harris, supra; 
Pirkle v. Oakdale Union etc. School Dist., supra; Burtis v. 
Universal Pictttres Co., Inc., supra; Turner v. Mellon, supra; 
Barrett v. City of maremont, S1lpra). Here, however, the 
majority cites the cases which have established the rule, and 
then misstates it and refuses to apply it to this case. In this 
connection the majority opinion states: ''Whether or not 
defendant was guilty of negligence [citing cases] or plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence [citing cases] is ordi-
narily a question of mixed fact and law and may be deter-
mined as a matter of law only if reasonable men following 
the law can draw but one conclusion from the evidence pre-
sented.'' The foregoing is not a correct statement of the rule. 
192 GRAY v. BRINKERHOFF [41 C.2d 
·while the statement of the rule has been couched in different 
language in some of the cases, it has been repeatedly declared 
as follows: " 'It is only where no fact is left in doubt, and no 
deduction or inference other than negligence can be drawn by 
the jury from the evidence, that the court can say, as a matter 
of law, that contributory negligence is established. Even 
where the facts are undisputed, if reasonable minds might 
draw different conclusions upon the question of negligence, 
the question is one of fact for the jury.' (Johnson v. Southern 
Pacific R. R. Co., 154 Cal. 285 [97 P. 520] ; Seller v. Market 
St. Ry. Co., 139 Cal. 268 [72 P. 1006] ; Herbert v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 121 Cal. 227 [53 P. 651].)" (Zibbell v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 160 Cal. 237, 241 [116 P. 513] .) What the majority 
here mean by the phrase, "reasonable men following the law" 
is not clear. However, by its attempted application of the rule 
to this case, I assume that the majority mean that those Jus-
tices who constitute the present majority of this court are the 
only "reasonable men following the law" who have passed 
on the issues in this case. If that is what the majority intend 
to imply, and I can conceive of no other meaning, then I 
resent the implication both on behalf of the members of the 
jury, the learned trial judge and the three able and honorable 
members of the District Court of Appeal (see Gray v. 
Brinkerhoff (Cal.App.) 249 P.2d 571) as well as for myself, 
all of whom disagree with the conclusion reached by the ma-
jority of this court in this case. According to the majority 
none of the above persons is a reasonable person following 
the law. 
I have no hesitancy in stating that I am not at all chagrined 
to be so classified by the majority of this court, as I am con-
fident that neither unbiased contemporary observers nor pos-
terity will sanction the distortions to which the majority of 
this court has resorted in its attempt to justify its invasion 
of the fact finding functions of the jury and trial judge. I 
feel rather that those who believe in the democratic process 
may properly but regretfully refer to this period in our 
judicial history as the era when the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia assumed the role of the fact finder in negligence cases. 
I have examined the record in this case and find no error 
prejudicial to plaintiff. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
